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Understanding the Individual Mandate's SCOTUS Pivot Points
Abstract
One of the most controversial elements of the recent health reform legislation embodied in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been the individual mandate. The mandate works as a
conditional tax: by 2016, when the tax is fully phased in, individuals who do not purchase insurance
coverage will pay about $60 per month. Exemptions are provided for those for whom the cheapest
insurance plan would be unaffordable.
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Understanding The Individual Mandate's SCOTUS
Pivot Points
Justices Ponder Adverse Selection, A Potential 'Death Spiral' and
Severability
By Ari Friedman and Nora Becker... | ...April, 2012 ... | ... Comment Below

O

ne of the most controversial elements of the recent health reform
legislation embodied in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) has been the individual mandate. The mandate works as a
conditional tax: by 2016, when the tax is fully phased in, individuals who do not
purchase insurance coverage will pay about $60 per month. Exemptions are
provided for those for whom the cheapest insurance plan would be unaffordable.
Not only is the mandate the least popular component of health reform, it is the most
legally vulnerable. This week the Supreme Court heard arguments on the
constitutionality of the mandate.
The Justices must decide whether
the Constitution's explicit provision
of the power to regulate interstate
commerce to the Federal
government includes the power to
regulate "inactivity"  the failure to
purchase health insurance, in this
case.
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In the event that they rule that
The Supreme Court will soon rule on the fate of
the mandate is unconstitutional,
Affordable Care Act's individual mandate that would
they must then rule whether or
require all citizens to purchase health care insurance.
not it is "severable" from the rest
of the ACA. If the mandate is both ruled as unconstitutional and nonseverable, the
majority of the law will be dismantled.
But what makes the mandate severable or not? The mandate would be severable
if ACA sansmandate wouldn't leave the insurance market with even more
problems than it has today. To see if this will happen, we need to take a look at the
economic theory that justified the mandate in the first place: adverse selection. We
also need to see whether the theory holds up in reality.

Contac t

The Economic theory
Adverse selection is when sicker people are more likely to buy insurance than
healthy people, and insurance companies are not able to adjust their premiums to
account for the higher risk. This drives the average healthcare costs of the
insurance plan higher, since the typical enrollee is sicker. This happens because
people who buy insurance have more information about their likely health costs
than insurance companies.
Adverse selection can also happen if insurers are prohibited from acting on
information about patients  like their gender or health status  by raising their
prices for sicker patients. These prohibitions are called "community rating" and
"guaranteed issue," and are put in place to try to prevent insurers from making
insurance too expensive for the chronically ill. The ACA implements community
rating and guaranteed issue nationwide, which is one reason why the mandate was
included in the bill.
One implication of adverse selection is that even if everyone wants insurance and is
willing to pay more than their expected cost of medical care to obtain it, the market
will not ensure that everyone is able to purchase insurance. Consequently,
government intervention in the
form of a subsidy or a mandate
could improve the wellbeing of
society as a whole.
'Death spiral'
The worstcase scenario of
adverse selection is a "death
spiral." In a death spiral, prices
rise so much that over time the
person who last year decided
Slide Presentation: Click to view "The Economics
Behind The Individual Mandate" (5 minutes)
that it was barely worth
purchasing an insurance
contract decides this year to forgo insurance and risk the financial burden of
getting sick instead. If this happens year after year, only the very sickest are left
insured  and at very high prices.
Were that the entire story then very little data would be required to determine how
important the mandate is to the overall health reform package. However, adverse
selection does not have to exist in markets. Even when it does exist, adverse
selection can be small enough that markets do not fall apart. Therefore, we have to
examine the data to see what would happen if the Supreme Court strikes down the
mandate.
The Massachusetts mandate
The best test of the impact of an individual mandate is from the state of
Massachusetts, which implemented statewide universal health care coverage in
2006. Its health reform plan was very similar to the Affordable Care Act: it included
an individual mandate, subsidies to help lower income individuals afford insurance,
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and a health insurance exchange where individuals could easily search for and
choose affordable insurance plans. The subsidies began in June 2007, and the
mandate began to be enforced in December 2007.
Reform was very successful in reducing uninsurance rates in Massachusetts.
Before the reform legislation, uninsurance rates were 20% among people with
income below 300% of the federal poverty level (FPL). With the creation of the
subsidies uninsurance fell to 14%, and after the mandate was implemented it was
reduced to 2.6% among the total population, and to about 5% for people below
300% FPL.
Several studies have examined whether adverse selection was present in
Massachusetts by looking at the impact of the individual mandate. Chandra, Gruber
and McKnight (2011) considered enrollees in the Massachusetts private health
insurance plan Commonwealth
Care, and compared rates of
chronic illness in enrollees in the
periods both before and after the
mandate went into effect. Figure 1
at left is the key figure from this
study.
Figure 1 plots the enrollment
rates of both healthy and
Click for Larger Image
chronically ill consumers over
Figure 1 Shows the enrollment rates of both healthy
time. The second dotted line is
and chronically ill Massachusetts consumers over time.
December 2007, the month that
the penalty for the mandate
began to be assessed. As this figure shows, the rates of healthy enrollees
increased more than the rate of chronically ill enrollment following the
implementation of the mandate. Specifically, enrollees who signed up for insurance
before the mandate went into effect were 50% more likely to be chronically ill and
had 45% higher health care costs than individuals who signed up after the
mandate was implemented. That means the mandate increased enrollment rates
of enrollees who were healthier, thus reducing adverse selection.
This suggests that adverse selection was present in Massachusetts before the
mandate, but what was the magnitude of its impact upon prices? Several studies
have tried to estimate the effect of the mandate upon prices. They found that the
individual mandate likely only led to a 3% decrease in the average price of
premiums statewide.
However, this change is averaged across both the employerbased and individual
insurance markets. Since most people don't choose their job based primarily on its
insurance, adverse selection is much more significant in the individual market.
Since the individual market is about 15% of the entire market for health insurance,
an 18% decrease in prices in the individual market would cause the 3% overall
change. Other evidence from Massachusetts suggests that prices in the individual

markets fell by up to 20%. This is a large effect on prices and could be large
enough to cause a death spiral in the individual health insurance market.
The bottom line
If the Supreme Court rules the individual mandate unconstitutional, available
evidence from Massachusetts suggests that eliminating it but leaving the rest of the
ACA intact would likely not cause a "death
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If the Supreme Court decides that this "death
spiral" scenario is likely, they could rule that
the mandate is not severable from the rest of
the Affordable Care Act, and strike down the
entire bill. Alternatively, they could eliminate
the individual mandate along with a few other
key provisions that cause adverse selection,
like community rating and guaranteed issue.
We have only discussed the impact of the
individual mandate on prices, and haven't
talked about other benefits to society of
lowering rates of uninsurance. If the Supreme
Court strikes down the mandate, these

potential benefits will be lost as well.
For instance, since hospitals are forced to stabilize any acutely ill person who
needs treatment, striking down the mandate would lead to a continuation of the
current situation, in which hospitals are forced to bear the costs of that
uncompensated care. This is why states mandate car insurance  to protect the
party who was not responsible for the incident from having to pay for it if the
person who caused the accident is not insured. Also, as we discussed earlier, even
absent a death spiral, adverse selection means that people who want to buy health
insurance  and are willing to pay their fair share for it  cannot.
Thus the individual mandate is based upon sound economic principles. However,
economics are only one factor in the Supreme Court's decision. The justices must
also consider issues of constitutionality, legal precedent, and the reach of
congressional authority. If these legal issues cause them to rule against the
mandate, a key policy tool initially proposed by Republicans to enable a market
based solution to the unique challenges of health insurance will be lost.
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